We consider a model of power distribution in a social system where a set of agents play a simple game: the probability of winning each round is proportional to the agent's current power, and the winner gets more power as a result. We show that inequality grows naturally up to a certain stationary value characterized by a sharp difference between a higher and a lower class of agents, where the latter can not call the bets placed by the former. High class agents are separated by one or several lower class agents which serve as a geometrical barrier preventing further flow of power between them. Moreover, we consider the effect of redistributive mechanisms, such as proportional (non-progressive) taxation. Sufficient taxation will induce a phase transition towards a more equal society, but an insufficient tax level may have counterintuitive effects in the inequality level, since it may reduce the effectivity of the geometric barriers preventing accretion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Inequality of income, wealth or power is one of the main social and political concerns [1, 2] , since it undermines social welfare and democracy [4] and economic growth [3] . Thus, a correct understanding of the dynamics of inequality has become one of the main research topics of theoretical social science and economics. There are two main types of basic explanations of social inequality [5, 6] . On one hand there are models based on the disparity of human skills, which claim that inequality increases are related to a large extent to the growth in technological complexity, that puts a bigger prize on certain rare skills. On the other hand there are theoretical approaches based on self-organization and the intrinsic instability associated to the accretion of wealth: money begets money.
Statistical mechanics can play a significant role in this endeavour. The interchange of wealth between individuals was compared to the interchange of energy between the molecules of a gas which leads to the Boltzmann-Gibbs distribution. Yet, in 1960 Mandelbrot [7] remarked the difficulty of making this view compatible with one of the main empirical observations about the distribution of income or wealth, known as Pareto's law: the population with income above u falls like u −α for large enough u. In 1996, Stanley et al. [8] remarked that power-laws were, in fact, ubiquitous in physical systems with long-range correlations. Moreover, they coined the term econophysics, in analogy to biophysics, to describe the application of statistical mechanical concepts and methods to the study of the economy [9] , with agents playing the role of atoms [10] [11] [12] [13] .
These agents can be simple or complex, and in modern approaches they are even allowed to learn from their experience [14] . Most analysis in econophysics favor agents following simple rules, yet showing rich dynamics. In 2000, Bouchaud and Mézard showed that a simple model with random speculative trading might be mapped to the well-known problem of directed polymers [15] , showing a phase transition between a relatively egalitarian and an extremely unequal phase. The same year, Drȃgulescu and Yakovlenko [16] , and Chakraborti and Chakrabarti [17] , used very simple models with conserved wealth and random interchanges, with or without savings, to describe different equilibrium distributions. These models were found to yield Pareto distributions in some regimes [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] [23] [24] , see [25, 26] for reviews. Some recent models have considered the effect of personal savings and taxation [27] . Other studies have focused on the appearance of social classes [28] , making use of multiplicative stochastic processes in their modelling.
Our work proposes a model with these main features: (a) agent interactions amplify inequalities: the more you earn, the easier it is to earn even more; this active element of wealth motivates us to call it power; (b) geometric constraints: agents can only interact with their neighbors; (c) a global redistributive mechanism, which we will call taxation. As we will show, this dynamics gives rise generically to a higher and a lower class of agents, created through the amplification of initial random fluctuations in combination with geometrical constraints. The role of taxation can be non-trivial: a low amount of taxation can, in fact, increase the inequality levels up to a certain extent. Yet, for a higher value of the taxation level, we report the existence of a phase transition towards a much more equal system.
Similar phenomena of amplification of random fluctuations make appearance in other areas. For example, many models of interfacial dynamics show a higher growth rate at peaks than at valleys, giving rise to the socalled shadowing instability [29, 30] , which explains e.g. the characteristic flower-like shapes of bacterial colonies in a medium with limited nutrients [31, 32] . Moreover, fluctuations are also amplified in Pólya's urn model [33, 34] , where we are asked to pick a ball from an urn and replace it with several balls of the same color. Interestingly, Pólya's urn model has found several applications in social science, e.g. to innovation [35] .
We should remind the reader that this work presents merely a different kind of statistical mechanics model, whose merit is to characterize how the amplification of noisy events can give rise to the creation of a strong class division, and the most efficient ways through which these effects might be mitigated. We do not put forward any claims regarding actual social inequality in society. The article is organized as follows. Section II discusses the power game in some detail. The case of two players is exposed in Sec. III. In Sec. IV we consider a onedimensional array of players in detail, combining tools from economics, information theory and kinetic roughening. The article ends with conclusions and some suggestions for further work.
II. THE POWER GAME
Let us consider N agents, connected through a certain graph G. Agent i is endowed with a certain magnitude which we will call power, w i ≥ 0. Total power is normalized to be one,
The initial distribution of power will always be homogeneous, i.e. w i = 1/N for all i. At each round, a randomly selected agent i will propose a bet to her neighbors within the graph [38] . The agent will bet a certain fraction of her power, αw i with α < 1, and will ask her neighbors to call the bet. Neighbor players whose power is larger than αw i are forced to do so, all others are discarded. Let B i be the set of active players, whose cardinal is m i . A winner is chosen with probability distribution proportional to their power, i.e. the probability that player j ∈ B i will win is
After a winner is chosen, she earns an extra amount of power αw i (m i − 1), and all others reduce their power in the amount αw i . Figure 1 provides an illustration of the basic power-game procedure.
In order to determine a proper time scale, we will define a time-step as a sequence of N rounds of the power-game. During the first time step the homogeneous system develops random fluctuations, and these fluctuations will grow with time. In the long run, most agents will be ruined, possessing negligible power, and a few of them will concentrate nearly all the power. A clear class division can be established in our case: agents who can call all possible bets by their neighbors are termed powerful, and correspond to the higher class. Agents who can not call some bets will be termed powerless, or lower class. In some situations, a single agent may accumulate all the power for long times. First stage: the selected agent is depicted in red, while the two neighbors appear in green, all others in gray. The bar under each player indicates her power. Second stage: players separate their bet. Third stage: a winner has been chosen (player i + 1), and she receives all three bets. Bottom: two profiles for a system with N = 50 and α = 0.01, for short and long times (t = 1 and t = 1000). Notice that, in the long run, high class agents are effectively separated by low class ones.
A. Redistribution
In order to diminish the drive towards inequality, we may introduce a global redistribution mechanism, which we will call taxation. After each time-step, all players will provide to a central authority an amount τ w i of their power, with a fixed τ < 1 that we will call the tax rate. The total collected amount, which is equal to τ , is shared equally among them. In other words:
Notice that taxation reduces the power possessed by individuals whose power exceeds the average value, 1/N , and increases the power of the rest. Also, notice that our proposed taxation mechanism is non-progressive, since all players must provide the same fraction of their power.
B. Measuring inequality
The set of {w i } will be called a profile. We define the width or roughness of the profile in similarity to the definition in kinetic roughening [36] :
where we substract 1/N because it is the average power possessed by all agents. Notice that N W 2 is the variance of the power. Another useful measure of inequality is the Shannon entropy of the profile, defined by [37] . Since all powers {w i } are positive and add up to one, they can be regarded as a probability distribution and we have
Notice that N eff = exp(S) can be used as an estimate for the number of active players. In effect, if we choose an agent k with probability w k , transmitting our choice will require S bits, similarly to a choice among N eff equally likely agents. We will also consider a sorted version of the profile, {ω i }, in non-increasing order: ω 1 ≥ ω 2 ≥ · · · ≥ ω N . In other terms, ω k is the power possessed by the k-th most powerful agent. It allows us to define the fraction of agents with power larger than w, ρ(w), through the following relation: ρ(w) = k/N when ω k = w. Moreover, we will define the Lorenz curve [26] , L(k/N ) is the total power possessed by the poorest k players:
The Lorenz curve allows to define the Gini coefficient [26] of the distribution as the area between the Lorenz curve and the perfect equality value,
It can be shown to correspond to the expected value of the differences of power of two different players, multiplied by N ,
In order to gather some intuition, let us consider a case where N u upper class agents concentrate all the power among themselves, equally. The width of the distribution can be found applying Eq. (4),
The entropy of the distribution can be found to be S = log(N u ), expressing the amount of information required to transmit the identity of an agent selected with a probability equal to her power. On the other hand, the Gini index can be found using Eq. (7), and it is
i.e. equal to the fraction of lower-class individuals.
III. TWO PLAYERS GAME
Let us consider the case with two players, with powers w 1 and w 2 . With some abuse of notation, let us call w i (t) the expected value for the power of the first player at time t. The expected amount of the bet is α/2 (αw i (t) when placed by player i). If she wins, she will gain an amount of power ≈ α, but only with probability w i (t). Thus, the expected value for w i (t + 1) is given by
This equation can be iterated, and we obtain
In other words, the expected value of the power will increase (decrease) exponentially when the initial value is above (below) 1/2, exp(±γt), with γ = log(1 + α). This approach does not inform us about the fluctuations. Thus, a more detailed calculation is needed. Table  I shows the payoff matrix for a single power-game with two players, depending on who is the gambler and who is the winner.
The expected gain of player 1 is given by the following expression:
Gambler Winner Probability Gain where the sum is implicitly extended over all possible outcomes.
In order to obtain the variance of the gain of player 1, we make use of Table II , where we describe the expected squared deviations with respect to the expected gain. Thus, the variance of the gain of player 1 is given by 
Both predictions, Eq. (13) and (14), are checked against numerical simulations in Fig. 2 , for a small number of rounds (100) and a low value of α = 10 −3 . The fit is remarkably accurate.
Interestingly, the collapse of all deviation curves shown in Fig. 2 and predicted in Eq. (14) depends on the precise rules employed. As a check, we have considered an alternative version of the power game, in which the bet is fixed to α/2 instead of being proportional to the power of the gambler. Table III shows the payoff matrix in this case for two players. Please notice that, in this variant of the game, the choice of the gambler is irrelevant, since the bet will always be the same. We can estimate in this case the expected gain and its variance, as we did in the standard power-game, obtaining the following result:
Gambler Winner Probability Gain
We observe that the expected gain coincides with the standard game, but the deviation is proportional to the initial value of the power of player 1. Fig. 3 shows the histograms, expected gain and deviation of the power of player 1, similarly to Fig. 2 . One can see that the histogram only contains delta peaks, since the amounts of power of player 1 can only be given by w 1 (t) = w 1 (0)+ mα, where m ∈ Z. 
IV. ONE-DIMENSIONAL POWER-GAME
The power-game, as described in Sec. II, is defined on an arbitrary graph. We will consider in this section the application to a number N of players displayed along a ring. For all cases, we have run 100 simulations and averaged the results, checking for convergence.
A. Without Taxes
The average width of the power distribution W , given by Eq. (4) , is shown as a function of time for different numbers of players and values of α in the top panel of Fig.  4 . In all cases, the tax level was set to zero. The time axis is rescaled, as αt, while the width axis is also rescaled, as N W . Notice that all curves start at zero W , reaching a saturation level for long times. The rescaling allows all curves to have the same saturation, independently of α and N , and a very similar saturation time. For short times, W grows as a power law, W ∼ t 1/2 , in agreement with Family-Vicsek scaling for kinetic roughening [36] in the case of random deposition. Yet, before saturation the width increases much faster. The inset shows that this second stage of growth is, indeed, exponential, which does not correspond to Family-Vicsek scaling.
The evolution of the Shannon entropy S, Eq. (5), is shown in the bottom panel of Fig. 4 . The time-axis is again rescaled as αt, while the entropy is shown as exp(S)/N , in order to make all curves collapse, for different values of N and α. Assuming that the effective number of agents is N eff ∼ exp(S), exp(S)/N = N eff /N , i.e. the fraction of high class agents, which for long times converge to ≈ 1/3.
The inset of the bottom panel of Fig. 4 shows the time evolution of the Gini index, with time again scaled as αt. We notice that it evolves from G = 0 to G ∼ 0.7. In the class division picture, this value corresponds to the fraction of lower class agents, which should be close to 2/3.
Thus, our observations are compatible with the conjecture that, for long times, the system is divided into an upper class, containing ≈ 1/3 of the agents, more or less equal in power, and a lower class, with the rest of the agents. The lower class agents possess negligible power, and are unable to call the bets placed by the higher class agents. Thus, the origin of the 1/3 fraction should be understood in the following way: equilibrium is reached when each high class agent is surrounded by two lower class ones which are not neighbors of any other high class agent. A minimal distribution with this property is built by alternating one high class and two lower class agents, thus giving rise to the observed division.
Moreover, two high class agents can never be neighbors in equilibrium. The mean value of the separation between neighboring high class agents, defined as the number of lower class agents between them, is two. Yet, the equilibrium states are not perfect crystals, and this separation is only obtained as an average.
We can obtain further insight about the power distribution by considering the time evolution of the sorted profile: {ω k }, as shown in the top panel of Fig. 5 for N = 10 3 and α = 10 −3 . Not all values of ω k are shown, only one out of every 10: k = 10m + 1. In an initial short time regime, the values diverge exponentially from the initial one, 1/N . But for αt ∼ 1, the maximal probability ω 1 saturates. Even before, many of the lesser agents have started an extremely fast decay.
In the bottom part of Fig. 5 we show the full sorted profile, {ω k }. The top panel shows these sorted profiles for different times for the previous system, N = 10 3 and α = 10 −3 . Notice that, for very short times, N ω k ∼ 1, while it grows more and more unequal for larger times. The stationary curve has been obtained with a good approximation for t = 5000, the last curve. For t = 1 the sorted profile is totally flat. We see that two classes de- The collapse of the top part of the profiles show that the parameter α determines the time-scale, while N determines the length scale. The continuum limit is obtained for α → 0 and N → ∞.
B. With Taxes
Let us determine the effects of redistribution, through the use of taxes, as shown in Eq. (3). As we will see, a complicated crossover takes place for τ ∼ α, from an unequal distribution to a homogeneous one, with unexpected effects in the intermediate region. Fig. 6 shows the width, entropy and Gini for a system with N = 10 3 , α = 10 −3 and different taxation levels. The width, W , grows for short times as W ∼ t 1/2 in all cases. For low taxation levels, τ < 3α, it still presents the same features of the no-taxation case, with the accelerated growth of the inequality near saturation, and the saturation levels reached are similar. But above that threshold value, the behavior changes drastically, with the saturation level falling sharply after a small increase in the taxation level.
The central panel of Fig. 6 provides further information about this potential phase transition. We see the time evolution of the effective number of players, or size of the high class, estimated from the entropy, Eq. (5). Indeed, for τ < 3α this number decays steadily down to a value of order N/3. Yet, for τ ≥ 3α, the effective number of players does not seem to decay, even in the long run. Thus, we conjecture that the system is not divided into classes any more. The Gini index, depicted in the inset of Fig. 6 , shows the same behavior: it grows steadily to a value close to 0.7 for τ < 3α, and remains close to zero for τ ≥ 3α.
Yet, a careful analysis of the two top panels of Fig. 6 holds a surprise more. Indeed, the long term N eff is not a monotonously increasing function of τ : for τ = α it takes a larger value than for τ = 2α, although just marginally so. This effect is checked carefully in the bottom panel of Fig. 6 , where the equilibrium (long term) values of the three previous observables (width W , entropy S and Gini G) are plotted as a function of the taxation level, τ /α. Interestingly, we observe in all three the same trend: a low taxation brings about a mild decrease in inequality. Yet, increasing the taxation level from τ = α/2 to τ = 2α increases the inequality a tiny amount. If we increase the taxation level further, inequality disappears sharply.
The reason seems to be that mild levels of taxation may have a counterintuitive effect on inequality: by providing enough power to the worse-off agents, the high class agents are not effectively isolated and can still compete among themselves.
The top panel of Fig. 7 shows the time evolution of selected values of ω k , for k = 10m + 1. Notice that for τ = α (top panel, τ = 10 −3 α), the evolution is very similar to the case without taxes. For τ = 2α (central panel), the time axis seems to be stretched, but inequality builds up anyway. For τ = 3α, on the other hand, the system is basically egalitarian, with a negliglible spread.
The bottom panel of Fig. 7 shows the stationary sorted profiles, {ω k } for different taxation levels. For τ = 3α the profile is basically flat, but we can see that the situation can be involved for other taxation levels.
Within the economics literature, two curves present special relevance: L(i/N ), the Lorenz curve, defined in Eq. (6) and the wealth function, ρ(w), defined as the probability of finding an agent with power larger than w. The interest of these functions, which are not usual in the physics literature, is highlighted in Fig. 8 . The top panel shows the Lorenz curve for the aforementioned cases. Notice that the diagonal line corresponds to the case of perfect equality, while the area between the curve and the diagonal line is the Gini index. We notice that for very low taxation level the Lorenz curve is barely different from the no-taxation one, while for larger values the system changes drastically in a short span of taxation levels.
The ρ(w) function is shown in the bottom panel of Fig.  8 for the same systems. We also see the strong difference achieved through a very small change in the taxation level for τ ∼ α. For τ = 3α the wealth distribution ρ(w) has a sharp decline around w = 1/N , showing a basically egalitarian system. Yet, for τ ∼ α the curve becomes more involved, with several steps, reflecting the complex behavior of the equilibrium distribution for low taxation levels. Bottom: probability of finding an agent with power larger than w, as a function of w, for the same systems.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK
In this article we have researched a random nonstrategic power-game which may describe some features associated to the accretion of wealth and power in social systems. The resource distributed among the agents is called power instead of wealth to emphasize its active character: obtaining power makes an agent more likely to obtaining even more power. In other words, the probability of winning each round is proportional to the current power in possession of each agent. Thus, small fluctuations are naturally enhanced, leading to a morphological instability. At later stages, the agents can be divided into two classes: the high class, which can call all bets placed by other agents, and the lower class, which can not.
In the case of two players, the power difference will tend to increase exponentially, with a deviation in the expected difference of power growing steadily like t 1/2 .
The game is local: each agent can only play with her immediate neighbors. Thus, accretion can lead a stationary value when a large number of players are ruined in such a way that high class players become in practice isolated from each other. When the agents make up a ring, this leads to stationary states where the number of effective players is approximately one third of the total set.
Starting from an equal distribution of power, earlytime dynamics are described by Family-Vicsek scaling corresponding to random deposition. Yet, for longer times, the width of the interface grows exponentially, thus abandoning the Family-Vicsek paradigm. Shadowing instability typically leads to diffusion limited aggregation (DLA) behavior [29] [30] [31] , which seems to be absent from our case.
The introduction of redistribution mechanisms can revert this trend to the growth of inequality, but only if the taxation level is high enough. We can consider this effect in terms of a competition between time scales: τ −1 being the time-scale in which redistribution acts and α −1 the time scale associated to the natural growth of inequality. According to our numerical analysis, τ ≥ 3α leads to a homogenous society, but τ < 3α leads to a sharp class division. Even more: tax can have counterintuitive effect if τ ∼ α. An increase in the taxation level leads to an increase in the inequality levels. The reason is that a taxation level slightly above the bet ratio prevents the lower class to become really ruined, so the high class agents are not effectively isolated and can still compete among them.
The above behaviours have been analyzed by using different measures for the inequality of power, such as the width of the profile, the Shannon entropy (which leads to a natural estimate to the number of effective players) and the Gini coefficient, and leading to similar conclusions.
Many elements have been left out in this first analysis of the power game. The first one is the characterization of the observed phase transition between a class society and an equal society. A second one is dimensionality, or the effective range of the system. If agents are allowed to interact only with their neighbors in a fixed network, then the spread of inequality will be limited. This is related to a well-known social fact: inequality increases with globalization. In a fragmented world, an agent can become the richest of a certain domain, but in a fully connected world the same agent can become the richest of the whole system. In future work, we will show how geometrical considerations interact with the dynamics of inequality. Thus, it is relevant to characterize the dynamics of the power game on 2D or 3D lattices, and on scale-free and small-world networks, closer to social interaction.
